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COMMENT
RIOT INSURANCE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ON THE STATE AND FEDERAL LEVEL
Increasing attention has focused on the threat of civil disorder
since the Watts riots in August, 1965. The uprisings in Detroit and
Newark and the rash of violence following the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King in April, 1968, have substantiated the magnitude
of the problem. In 1967, there were 233 disorders in 34 states, causing
property damage estimated at $69,000,000.1 In 1968, the month of
April alone (following Dr. King's assassination) brought 202 disorders
in 36 states with estimated property damage of $58,000,000.2 While
the property damage was concentrated in three cities,3 the large num-
ber of states experiencing disorder indicates a problem of nationwide
concern.
With the risk of a riot that could completely destroy his business,
a merchant cannot afford to stay in the urban core area without the
financial protection of insurance. Without property insurance, it is
difficult to procure loans secured by mortgages. As a result, urban
redevelopment programs are stifled, and the urban core areas continue
to breed the discontent and demoralization that promulgate the
violence. Thus, insurance is a social necessity; "communities without
insurance are communities without hope." 4
Because fire (except for deterioration) represents the greatest
single cause of physical loss to property, the basic form of property
insurance protection is fire insurance.5 The standard fire insurance
policy excludes fire losses caused by "insurrection, invasion, bombard-
ment, rebellion, revolution, or military or usurped power; [or] by
order of any civil authority .... ,,6 The standard policy also excludes
1 RIOT DATA REVIw, APRIL AFTERMATH OF THE Kin ASSASSINATION 60
(Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis University Pub. No. 2,
1968).
2 Id. Between January and August of 1968 there were 313 racial dis-
orders resulting in 78 deaths and $78,000,000 of property damage. U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT, Oct. 7, 1968, at 29, 30.
3 Chicago, Washington, D.C. and Baltimore accounted for 84.5 percent
of the property damage. RIOT DATA REviEw, APRIL AFTERMATH OF THE KING
ASSASSINATION 62 (Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, Brandeis Uni-
versity Pub. No. 2, 1968).
4 PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL ADVISORY PANEL ON INSURANCE IN RIoT-AFFECTED
AREAS, MEETING THE INSURANCE CRISIS OF OUR CrIIS 1 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as HUGHES REPORT].
5 Id. at 18-19.
6 N.Y. INs. LAw § 168(6) (McKinney 1966).
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loss occurring "as a result of explosion or riot, unless fire ensue,
and in that event for loss by fire only."7 The standard fire insurance
policy is commonly combined with an extended coverage endorsement,
which in the typical instance covers losses due to "windstorm, hail,
explosion, riot, riot attending a strike, civil commotion, aircraft, ve-
hicles, and smoke."8  These insured losses, unlike the standard fire
coverage, include "pillage & looting"9 resulting from riots. Because
insurrections are expressly excluded from the policy, there has been
much discussion about whether the violence is insured riot or un-
insured insurrection.1" However, insurance companies have been
willing to indemnify any damage resulting from the recent civil dis-
orders under extended coverage endorsements. 1
Insurance companies have been hesitant about writing policies in
the urban core. These areas usually consist of older homes, built
closely together, with a certain disregard of fire prevention codes.1
Furthermore, unlike windstorms, floods, and brushfires, there is no
basis of experience (except for the last few years) from which to pre-
dict accurately, for rating purposes, potential riot damage. The
losses thus far attributable to riots are well within the financial
capacity of the insurance industry.'8 It is the unascertainable, po-
tential loss that concerns the industry and leaves it hesitant about
writing insurance in the urban core area.14
Because of this undesirable risk of writing insurance in the ur-
ban core, the industry faces a dilemma: On the one hand, there is the
social need for property protection in these areas; while on the other
7 N.Y. INs. LAw § 168 (6) (McKinney 1966).
8 See, e.g., Extended Coverage Endorsement No. 4, N.Y. Standard Form
820, reprinted in E. PATTRSON, CASES AND MATERALs oN INSuRACcE 770 (3d
ed. 1955).
9 Id.
10 For a good discussion, see Johnson, The Insurer and Civil Disorders,
35 INs. COuNSEL J. 408 (1968); Comment, Insurance Protection Against Civil
Demonstrations, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 706 (1966); Comment Compensa-
tion for Victims of Urban Riots, 68 CoLUm. L. REV. 57 (1968).
11 See Comment, Compensation for Victims of Urban Riots, 68 CoLEm. L.
REv. 57, 65 (1968).
12 HUGHEs REPORT, supra note 4, at 122.
13 The approximately $50 to $75 million total of insured losses in 1967
from riots represented about 10-15 percent of the total extended cov-
erage premiums. Id. at 19. The Watts riot caused an insured loss equal to
20 percent of the national extended coverage premiums for 1965. However,
Hurricane Betsy alone caused an insured loss of $715 million, more than the
total annual premiums for extended coverage. Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 24, at 27 (1967).
14 Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 24, at 14 (1967); HUGHEs REPORT, supra note 4, at 40:
"Unless a rate has a proper allowance for an accumulation of contingency re-
serves, catastrophe losses deal a severe blow to profits, and may even im-
pair the solvency of the company."
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hand, there is the desire of stockholders to realize sound profits. 15
These two alternatives seem hardly reconcilable, thus fostering the
inadequacy of basic coverage available to the "inner city."
In 1967, the President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in
Riot Affected Areas conducted a survey of urban core property own-
ers in six cities.' 6 Of the people interviewed, 20.1 percent of the com-
mercial risks and 6.5 percent of the dwelling risks did not carry fire
and extended coverage insurance.' 7 An even greater percentage did
not have burglary and theft coverage.' These high percentages of
uninsured risks can be attributed to several factors. Of all the com-
mercial property owners interviewed, 5.8 percent claimed they did
not carry fire and extended coverage because they could not afford
it.' 9 Of the dwelling risks, only 1.7 percent of the total attributed
lack of insurance to cost.20 Unavailability was listed by 7.2 percent
of the commercial property owners and by 3.4 percent of the dwell-
ing owners as the reason for not having fire and extended coverage
insurance.2' Many people who had been able to obtain insurance at
15 See Pfeffer, The Role of Insurance in Solving Social Problems, BEST'S
INs. NEWS, June, 1967, at 14 (Fire & Casualty ed.).
16 Approximately 3000 personal interviews were conducted in Boston,
Cleveland, Detroit, Newark, Oakland, and St. Louis. HUGHEs REPORT, supra
note 4, at 126. This survey is, to date, the only comprehensive survey made
on the cost and availability of insurance in the urban core area.
17 Id. at 130, 143. The survey demonstrates the fact that insuring com-
mercial risks presents a greater problem than insuring dwelling risks. This
is what would be expected, as the merchandise in stores is the primary target
of looters during riots.
Is 48 percent of the commercial risks did not carry burglary and theft
insurance. Id. at 131.
19 5.8 percent is derived in the following computation from the data
supplied in Tables 5 and 8 of the HUGHEs REPORT. Id. at 130, 132.
283 (number of uninsureds) (percent of uninsureds who attributed
1393 (total interviewed) X 29.1 lack of insurance to cost).
20 1.7 pecent is derived in the following computation from the data sup-
plied in Tables 28 and 29 of the HUGHEs REPORT. Id. at 143, 144.
90 (number of uninsureds) (percent of uninsureds who attributed
1449 (total interviewed) X 27.9 lack of insurance to cost).
21 7.2 percent is derived in the following computation from the data
supplied in Tables 5 and 8 of the HuGHEs REPORT. Id. at 130, 132.
283 (number of uninsureds) (percent of uninsureds who attributed
1393 (total interviewed) X 35.4 lack of insurance to unavailability).
3.4 percent is derived in the following computation from the data sup-
plied in Tables 28 and 29 of the HUGHEs REPORT. Id. at 143, 144.
rof uninsureds) X (percent of uninsureds who attribu-
90 (number55.3 ted lack of insurance to
1449 (total interviewed) unavailability).
Only .4 percent of the commercial property risks of Oakland claimed un-
availability to be the reason why they had no insurance. This is derived in
the following computation from the data supplied in Tables 5 and 8 of the
HUGHEs REPORT. Id. at 130, 132.
22 (number of uninsureds in Oakland) (percent of uninsureds in
272 (total interviewed in Oakland) X 4.5 Oakland attributing lack ofinsurance to availability).
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one time subsequently incurred policy cancellations. During a three-
year period, 3.2 percent of the commercial risks reported cancellations
as compared with 1.9 percent of the dwelling risks.22
On the other hand, 6.2 percent of all the people surveyed gave
no reason whatsoever for not having fire and extended coverage on
commercial risks.23 Property owners in the core area need to be better
educated to the need for having a certain minimum amount of insur-
ance.
The problem, then, is as follows: The inability to obtain ade-
quate insurance is itself a serious cause of blight by holding back
development and rehabilitation; yet, without this development and re-
habilitation, the insurance industry is reluctant to provide the needed
insurance protection without some assistance. The resulting by-prod-
uct is a demoralization of the people,24 accompanied by a certain dis-
taste for insurance companies and by political pressure for govern-
mental intervention. Urban redevelopment programs are vitally
needed to assist in rebuilding the urban core areas to a level of pros-
perity and safety that will induce private industry to provide the
needed insurance coverage. 25 Fortunately, programs implemented
by private industry, the federal government, and several state gov-
ernments have also assisted in meeting the crisis by providing insur-
ance for deserving property owners in the urban core areas.
Private Industry
Pools
The evening exploded with the cry which became the slogan of the
Watts riots. Someone shrieked "Burn, Baby Burn!" The spark was
lit and for six days the city of Los Angeles underwent the most
severe disorder in its history.26
By the time order was restored, estimated property damage was over
This can be attributed largely to the flexible rate law in California. CAL.
INS. CODE § 1852. See also N.Y. Iws. LAw § 186(2) (McKinney 1966). See
text accompanying notes 65-66 infra.
22 HUGHES REPORT, supra note 4, at 139, 149.
23 6.2 percent is derived in the following computation from data sup-
plied in Tables 5 and 8 of the HuoHFs REPORT. Id. at 130, 132.
283 (number of uninsureds) - 244 (percent of uninsureds who reported
1393 (total interviewed) no problems).
24 The attitude of people in the ghetto is shown by the fact that of a
sample taken in the Watts area of Los Angeles following the 1965 riots, 34
percent were somewhat in favor of what had occurred, while up to 15 percent
of the Negro adult population had been active at some time during the rioting
in more than a spectator role. Hearings on S.J. Res. 102, supra note 13, at 81.
25 Some programs have been initiated. See, e.g., Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448 (Aug. 1, 1968); Economic Op-
portunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 270-2981 (1964). However, the former develop-
ment act had trouble obtaining sufficient appropriations in Congress to im-
plement the program adequately. San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chron-
icle, Oct. 13, 1968, § A, at 9, col. 8.
26 Hearings on S.J. Res. 102, supra note 13, at 79.
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$40,000,000.27 Thereafter, the insurance market in Watts tightened;
in a survey taken of the area, 14 percent of the merchants ques-
tioned had experienced cancellations, while 44 percent indicated an
availability problem.28 After receiving numerous complaints, the
California Insurance Commissioner called several insurance execu-
tives together and formed a committee to help process the complaints.
From this committee came the idea of creating a pool to provide fire
and extended coverage insurance for those deserving commercial risks
in Watts that could not obtain such protection in the normal mar-
ket.29 Thus, the pool was developed as a supplementary insurance
market for the "hard core problem" risk and was intended chiefly to
distribute these risks throughout the industry.30
When a property owner had been unable, after a diligent effort,
to obtain coverage in the normal market, he, along with his agent,
could apply to the pool for aid. The pool then determined whether
or not the applicant was insurable in the normal market. The prop-
erty was inspected to help answer this question. If it was decided
that coverage was unobtainable in the normal market, the information
from the inspection was used to decide whether the property met the
pool's underwriting standards and at what particular rate the prop-
erty might be insured. All policies were written by a front organi-
zation-the United States Liability. Insurance Company. This com-
pany was in turn reinsured by 110 companies that did business in the
Watts area. The amount of reinsurance by each company was in
proportion to the volume of its California business.
By March 1, 1968, the pool had written fire and liability coverage
for 553 risks accounting for coverage of $15,521,421.31 Because this
was only about 2 percent of the commercial risks in the area, the
pool seemed to be successful as a supplementary insurance market.
The 98 percent of the businesses not written in the pool obtained fire
and extended coverage insurance through normal channels or did not
report any difficulty in obtaining insurance.
There were several criticisms of the Watts pool. The policies
written by the pool were limited to fire and extended coverage insur-
ance on commercial risks in the Watts area. Thus, it did not provide a
source of burglary and theft coverage,32 nor did it provide protection
27 More than 600 buildings were damaged, and 200 were destroyed by
fire. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN THE
CiTY-AN END OR A BEGINNING 23 (1965).
28 Hearings on S.J. Res. 102, supra note 13, at 83.
29 For a good discussion of the Watts Pool, see HUGHES REPORT, supra
note 4, at 75-76; Hearings on S.J. Res. 102, supra note 13, at 83-84.
30 Hearings Before the President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance
in Riot Affected Areas, at 55 (1967).
31 INsuRANcE, April 6, 1968, at 38.
32 As already seen, there is more of a problem in obtaining burglary
and theft insurance than there is in obtaining fire and extended coverage.
See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
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for residential risks. While insurance was made available by the
pool for commercial risks, the premium rates were generally from 2.5
to 3 times the rates in the normal market.33 These rates, however,
were not prohibitive. One survey indicated that retailers insured in
the pool usually paid 50 cents or less for fire and extended coverage
insurance for every $100 of net sales, that is, less than 1 percent of
net sales.
34
Another problem with the Watts insurance pool was that of per-
suading insurance agents to encourage and assist the deserving prop-
erty owners in seeking insurance through the pool. As one agent
explained: "We avoid the writing of property insurance in ...
[Watts] as much as possible because of: (1) Difficulties in place-
ment, (2) The complicated procedure of the Industry Facility, and (3)
[T] he high cost." 35 One suggested solution to this problem is that the
industry could contribute to the development of an indigenous agency
that would be more responsive to the problems of the property owners
in the urban core area.
In conclusion, while the Watts pool was perhaps not the best
answer, it was nonetheless an answer. Many of the participants in the
pool considered it a temporary measure to alleviate the crisis until
some plan could be established by the federal government.
Urban Plans
Another solution adopted voluntarily by insurance companies to
solve the problem of providing basic property insurance to urban
core areas was the creation of urban plans.36 Typical of such plans
was the Oakland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles County Fire and
Extended Coverage Insurance Inspection Plan, created July 19, 1967.
This plan was offered by the insurance industry as an alternative
method (to proposed assigned risk legislation) of providing insurance
for property owners who had experienced difficulty in acquiring fire
and extended coverage protection.
33 Smith, The Watts "Pool"--Solution or Expedient?, J. INs. INFoRMATIoN,
Nov.-Dec., 1967, at 22, 25.
34 NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Oct. 13, 1967, at 28.
35 HUGHEs REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
36 The Boston Plan (1960); The Michigan Fire Insurance Inspection Plan
(Jan. 1, 1966); Cleveland Fire Insurance Inspection Plan (April 15, 1966);
The Voluntary Inspection and Advisory Committee for Milwaukee Core Area
Fire Insurance (Oct. 24, 1966); The Buffalo and New York City Fire and
Extended Coverage Inspection Plan (April 1, 1967); The Pennsylvania and
Delaware Sub-Standard Plan (Mar. 1, 1965); The Louisiana Owner-Occupied
Insurance Dwelling Program (April 1, 1967); The Minnesota Core Area Plan
(June 12, 1967); The Oakland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles County Fire
and Extended Coverage Insurance Inspection Plan (July 19, 1967); The North
Carolina Fire and Extended Coverage Plan for Properities in Beach Area of
Zone 1 (Sept. 18, 1967); The Wichita Agents' Plan (Dec. 1, 1967); Chicago
Home Inspection Plan (Dec. 1, 1967). For a short discussion of each plan,
see the HuGHEs REPORT, supra note 4, at 56-75.
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The plan called for an inspection of the owner's property by a
designated rating bureau upon request by the insurance agent. The
purpose of this inspection was to distinguish between properly main-
tained property and property in a substandard condition. After in-
spection the insurance company either wrote the coverage at standard
rates, wrote it at surcharged rates, or refused to write it altogether.
In the latter two cases, the company was required to supply the rea-
sons for its decisions to the rating bureau and the property
owner. However, each company was free to apply its own sur-
charged rating plan. The rating bureau, in turn, periodically informed
the state commissioner's office of the results in each case.
The urban plan in California was limited to residential risks. As a
result, the plan did not have a sufficient number of applicants to per-
mit a fair evaluation of its performance. In one year in San Fran-
cisco only 58 residential owners had taken advantage of the plan.
3 7
Several criticisms of the urban plans, which were in effect in 13
states by December 1, 1967, were expressed. One broker said that the
New York urban plan operated too slowly, cost too much, and did
not expand the market for insurance. The inspections usually took
two months, and the surcharges frequently did not reflect the actual
fire hazard.
38
In a Boston survey, 10.3 percent of the people living in dwellings
covered by the Boston Plan were unaware of it, and 45.5 percent did
not have their property inspected under it.-3  A substantial number
of those who could have benefited by an inspection did not avail
themselves of it because of their unawareness, demonstrating the prob-
lem of communication between the insurance industry and the urban
core property owner.
Municipal Liability
Fourteen states have enacted statutes imposing liability on mu-
nicipal corporations or counties for damage caused by riots. 40 It has
37 UNDERWRITERS' REPORT, July 4, 1968, at 3.
38 Hearings Before the President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance
in Riot-Affected Areas, at 4 (1967).
39 10.3 percent is derived in the following computation from the data
supplied in Tables 33 and 34 of the HUGHEs REPORT, supra note 4, at 146.
108 (number of people who did not
have their property inspected) (percent of uninspected who
233 (total number interviewed) were not aware of the plan).
45.5 percent is found in Table 33 of the HUGHES REPORT. Id. at 146.
40 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-108 (1958); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-203 (Supp.
1968); Ky. REV. STAT. 411.100 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3354 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 8
(Supp. 1968); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 537.140-.160 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 11-1503 (1947); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31.53 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:48-1 to 48-7 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, 88 11821-26 (1956); R.I. GE.
LAWS ANN. § 45-15-13 (1956); S.C. CODE ANI. § 16-107 (1962); Wis. STAT.
§ 66.091 (Supp. 1965).
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been argued that placing the financial burden on the municipalities
does provide a certain deterrence to future rioting.41 Imposing lia-
bility on the community may inspire it to maintain law and order.
However, it is doubtful that many taxpayers, upon whom the ultimate
financial burden rests, have any knowledge of such statutes;42 nor
does it seem likely that law enforcement officers have a greater con-
cern for maintaining law and order in those cities with municipal
liability than in those without it.
Most of the statutes impose some form of strict liability.43 Con-
sequently, the normal incentive for an owner to protect his property
against riot damage is decreased, since he knows he will receive
compensation from the municipality anyway. 44 In those states having
statutes imposing liability on municipalities for negligence,45 the in-
jured property owner has the difficult burden of proving that local
authorities did not use due care under the circumstances. Because
financial protection from riots is not dependent upon the condition
of the property (as is the case when seeking insurance), there is less
incentive for the property owner to maintain and improve the con-
dition of his property.
State Legislation
In 1968, the disorders following the assassination of Dr. Martin
Luther King brought further uneasiness to the insurance companies.
The state legislatures, particularly in the large urban states, realized
that remedial legislation was essential for the preservation of the
There has been a trend toward repealing statutes holding municipalities
liable. In Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961), it was held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was unjust and would no longer protect governmental entities from civil
liability in tort. Subsequently, a statute was passed stating that neither a
public employee nor a public entity is liable for failure to provide police
protection. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845. For good discussions of municipal liabil-
ity for damage due to riots, see Johnson, The Insurer and Civil Disorders, 35
INS. COUNSEL J. 408, 415 (1968); Rottman, Riot Damage, Municipal Liability,
and Insurance, 1968 INs. L.J. 597; Note, Compensation For Victims of Urban
Riots, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 57, 65 (1968); Note, Municipal Liability For Riot
Damage, 16 HAsTinGs L.J. 459 (1965); Comment, Riot Insurance, 77 YALE. L.J.
541 (1968).
41 Note, Municipal Liability for Riot Damage, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 459, 464
(1965); Comment, Riot Insurance, 77 YALE L.J. 541, 554 (1968).
42 Rottman, Riot Damage, Municipal Liability, and Insurance, 1968 INS.
L.J. 597, 604-05.
43 Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky and Maryland do not impose strict
liability on the municipalities. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 7-108 (1958); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 12-203 (Supp. 1968); Ky. REv. SwT. § 411.100 (1963); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1965).
44 See Rottman, Riot Damage, Municipal Liability, and Insurance, 1968
INs. L.J. 597, 605.
45 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-108 (1958); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-203 (Supp.
1968); Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.100 (1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 82, §§ 1-3 (1965).
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ghetto market. Michigan,46 New York,47 New Jersey,48 California,49
and Virginia50 passed legislation making insurance available to qual-
ified property owners who, after a diligent effort, could not obtain
coverage in the normal market.
The purposes of the Basic Property Insurance Inspection and
Placement Plan, initiated in California,"' are to stabilize the resi-
dential property market, to assure the availability of insurance, to
encourage the use of the normal market in obtaining insurance, and
to provide an equitable distribution among insurers of the responsi-
bility of insuring qualified property that could not be insured through
the normal market.52 This program was stimulated by the growing
problem of policy cancellations in California's brush fire areas.53 How-
ever, the plan is available to all dwelling risks throughout the state,
and thus it encompasses the urban core area as well as the brush fire
area.
The California legislation establishes a FAIR (fair access to insur-
ance requirements) plan, an industry placement facility, and a joint
reinsurance association.54 The plan insures only dwelling risks
and provides fire and extended coverage as well as vandalism and
malicious mischief insurance. However, further coverage may be
added from time to time as designated by the placement facility.
The industry placement facility is an organization composed of
all companies writing basic property insurance in the state. Its pur-
poses are to assist the owners and tenants of dwellings in obtaining
insurance and to administer a program for the equitable distribution
among the insurance companies of the risks covered by the plan in
accordance with their respective premium volume.55 There was
some disagreement in the insurance industry concerning how a state
plan should be implemented. Some favored an assignment of risks
to individual companies with reinsurance provided, while others fa-
vored a pool arrangement.8 California's plan incorporates both ideas
46 VIcH. CovMP. LAWS §§ 500.2901 to .2950 (Supp. 1969).
47 N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 651-58 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
48 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:37A-1 to -27 (Supp. 1969).
49 CAL. INS. COD §§ 10090-10101 (Supp. 1969). There had been previous
legislation proposed in California. Cal. S.B. 1276 (1965) (Fire Insurance
Assigned Risk System); Cal. A.B. 1737-40 (1965) (Catastrophe Insurance
Fund).
G0 VA. CoDE ANN. § 38.1-746 to -755 (Supp. 1968).
51 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10090-10101 (Supp. 1969).
52 CAL. INs. CODE § 10090 (Supp. 1969).
53 The insurance pool that provided coverage in the brush fire areas had
to terminate because of the inability to obtain reinsurance. See NATIONAL
UNDERWUTER, June 7, 1968, at 52. The reason for this termination was that
the ieinsurance market was not controlled by the government, and thus its
actions were related to profitability.
54 CAL. INS. CODE: § 10090 (Supp. 1969).
55 CAL. INS. CODS § 10094 (Supp. 1969).
56 See UN awnRasTE' REPORT, June 20, 1968, at 3.
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by stating that "[the industry's placement] facility. . . may provide
for the equitable distribution of risks ... by means of assignment to
individual members of such facility or by a pool or association of in-
surers participating in such facility."
57
The joint reinsurance association, also consisting of all insurers
writing basic property insurance in California, provides reinsurance
on risks written by insurers under the plan. Participation in the
association is likewise equitably distributed in proportion to premium
volume.
Membership in the placement facility and the reinsurance asso-
ciation is a prerequisite to conducting insurance business in the
state.58  The constitutionality of such a requirement was upheld in
California State Automobile Association v. Maloney.5 9 In that case,
the Insurance Commissioner of California suspended the right of the
appellant to transact automobile liability insurance business in the
state because of its refusal to participate in the California Assigned
Risk Plan.6 0 The appellant contended the statute violated the due
process clause of the 14th amendment on the grounds that it forced
insurance companies to enter into contracts against their will and that
it forced upon them business in which there was a high risk of loss.
The court declared: "[T]he power of the state is broad enough to
take over the whole business, leaving no part for private enterprise."61
Thus, the state did have authority to impose such a requirement. The
court also stated: "Appellant's business may of course be less pros-
perous as a result of the regulation. That diminution in value,
however, has never mounted to the dignity of a taking in the con-
stitutional sense.
'62
The FAIR plan provides that a property owner having an insurable
interest in a dwelling, after a diligent but unsuccessful effort to obtain
coverage in the normal admitted market,63 may apply to the place-
ment facility for an inspection of his property.64 If, after receiving
the inspection report, the facility decides that the risk is insurable
but cannot be written in the normal market, it will in turn provide
insurance for the property.
57 CAL. INS. CODE § 10100.1 (Supp. 1969).
58 CAL. INS. CODE § 10094 (Supp. 1969).
59 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
60 CAL. INS. CODE § 11620. This section provides for the "equitable ap-
portionment, among insurers admitted to transact liability insurance, of those
applicants for automobile bodily injury and property damage liability insur-
ance who are in good faith entitled to but are unable to procure such insur-
ance through ordinary methods."
61 California State Auto. Ass'n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105, 110 (1951).
62 Id. at 111.
63 "'Admitted,' in relation to a person, means entitled to transact insur-
ance business in this State, having complied with the laws imposing con-
ditions precedent to transaction of such business." CAL. INs. CODE § 24.
64 CAL. INS. CODE § 10093 (a) (Supp. 1969).
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The Insurance Placement Facility may establish maximum limits
of liability and reasonable underwriting standards, subject to the
approval of the Insurance Commissioner. 5 Vhile there is no express
provision in the act regarding insurance rates, the California Insur-
ance Code provides that no rate shall be "excessive or inadequate...
[or] unfairly discriminatory."6 6  A rate is not excessive "unless (1)
such rate is unreasonably high for the insurance provided and (2)
a reasonable degree of competition does not exist in the area with
respect to the classification to which such rate is applicable."16 7 Be-
cause of the limitations on underwriting standards and selectivity
imposed by The Basic Property Insurance and Inspection Plan, there
is not a reasonable degree of competition with regard to insurance
provided through the pool. Consequently, if the Insurance Commis-
sioner determines that the rates are unreasonable, they will be ex-
cessive and unlawful.
There are certain hazards to be avoided when plans such as
California's are implemented. They must not be used as a device to
insure the uninsurable. Otherwise, there may be a loss of incentive
to maintain the property in good condition because the property
owner would know that some company would be required to insure
the risk.
Such plans may also discourage maximum use of the normal
insurance market, which is precisely what happened in the brush fire
areas of California. Instead of renewing expired policies, companies
were dumping them into the state inspection and placement plan.
As a result, the plan was not being used as a supplemental insurance
market as had been intended.68 To correct such a problem, companies
could be given credit for the policies they voluntarily write in high
risk areas by proportionately decreasing their required participation
in the placement facility and the reinsurance association.6 9 Thus, in-
centive to utilize the normal market would be restored.
Federal Legislation
Not only has there been state activity toward initiating an insur-
ance program in the ghettos, this problem also has been receiving
close attention at the national level. By October, 1967, there had
been introduced in Congress several bills and resolutions concerning
65 CAL. INS. CODE § 10094 (Supp. 1969).
66 CAL. INS. CODE § 1852 (a).
67 CAL. INS. CODE § 1852 (a).
68 UNDERWRITERS' REPORT, Oct. 3, 1968, at 3.
69 See id. In previous proposed legislation, such a provision was in-
cluded. "The system shall permit reduction or elimination of assignments
to any insurer which otherwise issues residence fire insurance and home-
owner's insurance on single family residences in generally recognized high
hazard areas in reasonable proportion to all such insurance it issues in this
state." Cal. S.B. 1276 (1965).
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civil disorders and the attendant insurance problem.7° In January,
1968, the President's National Advisory Panel on Insurance in Riot
Affected Areas set forth specific proposals in its report, Meeting the
Insurance Crisis of our Cities.71 These proposals were subsequently
adopted and enacted by the Urban Property Protection and Reinsur-
ance Act of 1968.72
Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968
The purposes of the Act are to assist and encourage state insur-
ance authorities and the industry to establish programs offering in-
surance protection for those meeting reasonable standards, and to
provide a federal reinsurance program while placing appropriate fi-
nancial responsibility on the states.73
The new statute commits the federal government to a program
of reinsuring risks written by insurance companies in urban core
areas. However, for a company to be eligible for participation in the
program, there are two basic requirements that must be fulfilled.
(1) There must be in each state a plan to assure fair access to in-
surance requirements (FAIR plan), and each insurer, to be eligible for
federal reinsurance, must participate in such plan. The plan may vary
from state to state because of differing local conditions. However,
all state plans 'must contain the following provisions: No surcharged
rates or refusal to insure may be permitted until after an inspection
and a determination that reasonable underwriting standards have not
been met; the inspection may be requested by the property owner,
the insurance agent or the insurer; a report must be sent to the prop-
erty owner explaining why his risk has been declined, why the sur-
charge has been imposed, and what improvements are necessary for
the property to qualify for participation.74 Each state plan must also
include an all-industry placement facility that will, among other
things, distribute risks involved equitably among the insurers, and
will seek to place each risk to be insured with one or more insurers
in the state.75
(2) Within one year (or after the close of the next regular ses-
sion), each state must establish a fund in a minimum amount of 5
percent of the property insurance premium earned in the state during
the preceding year. This fund is to reimburse the federal Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development for amounts expended for rein-
70 See, e.g., S. 2209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2270, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); H.R. 12654, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S.J. Res. 102, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
71 HUGHEs REPORT, supra note 4.
72 Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1101-06, U.S. CODE CONG. & Ani=. NEws 2894
(Aug. 1, 1968).
73 Id. § 1102(b), at 2894.
74 Id. § 1211(b), at 2898.
75 Id. § 1212, at 2899.
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sured losses occurring in that state in excess of (A) reinsurance
premiums received in that state in the same year, plus (B) the excess
of premiums (measured from the last year the Secretary was reim-
bursed for losses in the state) over amounts paid for reinsured losses
that occurred in the same period.76
Federal reinsurance may be terminated after thirty days notice
to the insurer that the state has not adopted a plan to make property
insurance available without regard to environmental hazards. How-
ever, this proviso will not become effective -until August, 1970. Fed-
eral reinsurance may also be terminated after thirty days following
notification to the insurer that it is not fully participating in the
state's FAIR plan.
77
The reinsurance offered by the federal government is for fire
and extended coverage, vandalism and malicious mischief, and burg-
lary and theft, including losses from riots or civil disorders. The Act
calls for the establishment of the National Insurance Development
Fund, which will make payments as required under the reinsurance
contracts, will pay administrative expenses, and will repay any sum
that is borrowed from the Secretary of the Treasury to pay for riot
losses.
78
The program is administered by the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development, assisted by an advisory board composed of rep-
resentatives of the public, the insurance industry and the various
levels of government.79 This idvisory board reviews general policies
and provides the Secretary with expert advice. Its composition guar-
antees to many affected interests that their representatives will have
the opportunity to be heard.
The financing of the reinsurance plan is provided'in three separ-
ate layers. The first layer is private industry's contribution. The in-
dustry will assume a certain percentage of the primary risk. If the
claims for riot damage exceed this, amount, payment is made from
the fund created by the premiums paid by the companies for rein-
surance.80
The second level consists of the state back-up fund. This fund is
tapped only after the private funds have been completely utilized.8'
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development has authority,
when the first two levels of finance have been exhausted, to borrow
up to $250,000,000 from the Federal Treasury. Any money borrowed
will be repaid by subsequent premiums paid by the companies for
the reinsurance.
8 2
76 Id. § 1223 (a) (1), at 2902.
77 Id. § 1223(2)-(3), at 2902-03.
78 Id. § 1233 (a), at 2905.
79 Id. §§ 1201-02, at 2895.
80 Id. § 1222(b), at 2901.
81 Id. § 1223(a) (1), at 2902.
82 Id. § 1104, at 2908.
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Under this new federal legislation, it can be expected that, within
the next few years, states will create FAIR plans, with compulsory
participation by insurance companies, for both commercial and dwell-
ing risks. Since a state must, as a condition to obtaining federal
reinsurance within the state, provide a financial back-up for riot
losses, states will probably insist that the insurance companies doing
business in the state participate in a FAIR plan. Companies are not,
of course, required to take federal reinsurance; however, those com-
panies which do not must assume 100 percent of the losses they incur.
State legislatures can also be expected to provide funds for the fi-
nancial back-up required for participation in federal reinsurance.8 s
83 The idea of federal cooperation with private industry to solve insur-
ance problems is not new.
In the same omnibus housing bill that includes the riot reinsurance pro-
gram there is a federal flood insurance program. Pub. L. No. 90-448, §§ 1301-
77, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIn. NEWS 2915-36 (Aug. 1, 1968). The act author-
izes the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to provide by regu-
lation the terms of insurability applicable to properties eligible for flood in-
surance. Initial flood insurance legislation was passed in 1956. 42 U.S.C. §§
2401-21 (1964). However, no funds were ever appropriated for execution of
that program. The 1968 legislation repealed the Federal Flood Insurance
Act of 1956, except the authority to borrow $500 million from the Secretary
of the Treasury. Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1303, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIn. NEws
2916 (Aug. 1, 1968).
The flood insurance plan is limited to those states that have enacted
programs to control land development in flood-prone areas. Id. § 1305(c),
at 2917. The act also provides for the creation of a National Flood Insurance
Fund, which will make premium equalization payments to private insurers,
provide reinsurance, and make repayments of monies borrowed from the
Secretary of the Treasury. Id. § 1310(a), at 2921. The Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development is to encourage the formation of an insurance pool
composed of private insurers. Id. §§ 1331-1332, at 2926-27. If the pool is found
inadequate to provide the needed insurance, the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development is to take necessary steps to operate the program through
facilities of the federal government. Id. § 1340, at 2929.
As another example, the Export-Import Bank of Washington is author-
ized to insure and reinsure United States exporters and foreign exporters
doing business in the United States against political and credit risks of losses
arising in connection with United States exports. 12 U.S.C. § 635(c) (1)
(1964).
Finally, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provides that the Atomic Energy
Commission shall agree to indemnify the government licensee from public
liability arising from nuclear incidents that is in excess of the level of finan-
cial protection required of the licensee. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1964). The
Price-Anderson Act was enacted in 1957; it amended the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954: 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1964), amen'ding 68 Stat. 921 (1954). Section 2210
is intended to encourage the growth of private participation in the nuclear
industry, as well as to protect the public against possible nuclear hazards.
The section provides for government indemnity, plus a certain required
layer of private financial protection. Subsequently, Congress extended the
cut-off date for another ten years and decreased the amount of indemnity
provided by the Government. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Supp. 1969), amending 42
U.S.C. § 2210 (1964).
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Application and Appraisal of the Riot Reinsurance Act
The new Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968
guarantees an insurance market for insurable property with a mini-
mum impact on normal industry methods of serving the public. The
certainty of market will be provided by the creation of state FAIR
plans. These plans will be an improvement over existing urban
plans because they will each apply throughout the state to both
commercial and dwelling risks, they will cover all major lines of prop-
erty insurance, and their standards of insurability will be without re-
gard to "environmental hazards."8' 4 "Environmental hazard" is de-
fined as "any hazardous condition that might give rise to loss under
an insurance contract, but which is beyond the control of the property
owner .... ,,s5 Factors such as the availability of fire fighting equip-
ment and the condition of the surrounding neighborhood will not be
considered when determining whether a property owner is entitled to
insurance.
The Michigan Basic Property Insurance Plan appears to have the
best approach to determining the standards of insurability by stating
that property is qualified for the plan if it
[c]omplies with applicable state and local building codes and ordi-
nances to the extent conditions on the property reasonably related to
the perils insured against cannot be the subject of, or provide the
basis for, a corrective administrative or judicial order, a criminal
prosecution, or a civil fine or penalty .... 86
This language eliminates consideration of all "external hazards" and
considers only those pertinent "internal hazards." Consequently, one
whose own property, disregarding all surrounding circumstances, is
uninsurable will not be eligible in Michigan to obtain coverage
through the pool. This provides a desirable deterrence to property
owners who might otherwise allow their premises to deteriorate. If
the property owner were refused insurance for reasons beyond his
control, he would lose the incentive to give the property the care it
needs.
California's FAIR plan does not expressly exclude consideration
of environmental hazards. However, the Insurance Commissioner is
given authority by the statute to do those things necessary to en-
able the state and any insurer in the state to participate in any federal
reinsurance program that might be enacted.8 7 Therefore, the Cali-
fornia FAIR plan will qualify under the Federal Reinsurance Plan,
because the Commissioner has excluded consideration of environ-
mental hazards when determining whether property is eligible for
insurance. However, considering environmental hazards is not pre-
cluded in determining the applicable premium rates.
84 Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1223 (a) (2), U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 2902
(Aug. 1, 1968).
85 Id. § 1203 (a) (1), at 2896.
86 1MtcH. ComP. LAWS § 500.2901 (Supp. 1969).
87 CAL. INS. CODE § 10099 (Supp. 1969).
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The new federal program is desirable in that it leaves regulation
of the insurance industry almost exclusively with the individual
states. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Asso-
ciation88 the United States Supreme Court held that Congress had
the power to regulate insurance under the commerce clause of the
Constitution. Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which declares that "the continued regula-
tion ... by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest .... 89 The power to withhold federal reinsurance
under the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968,
when certain conditions are not met, is not a regulation of the insur-
ance industry, because the existing structure of the industry is left
undisturbed and governmental regulation remains in state control.
Consequently, the policy of the McCarran-Ferguson Act has not been
abridged.
By leaving the existing structure for providing insurance essen-
tially unchanged, the administrative expense of the federal reinsur-
ance program will be minimal. The federal plan affords security to
the insurance industry as a whole without involving governmental
participation until riot losses in a state exceed what private industry
can absorb. The theory underlying the new statute is that any money
expended by the federal government to indemnify riot losses will be
in substance a loan. As reserves accumulate from the premiums paid
by the insurance companies, any sums borrowed from the govern-
ment will be repaid. In the long run, as urban centers are improved
through redevelopment programs, 0 they will become more desirable
to insure from a business standpoint. Eventually, the private market
will find that insuring these areas has become profitable, and compe-
tition within the industry to provide coverage in the urban core will
commence. At this point federal and state back-up will be unneces-
sary, and governmental participation can be gradually eliminated.
Prior to the federal reinsurance act, there had been numerous
tax proposals designed to enable private industry to provide insur-
ance for urban centers without federal or state back-up.91 Many of
these plans called for the creation of a catastrophe reserve by insur-
ance companies. As long as this money remained in the reserve or
was used to indemnify riot losses, the reserve would have been free
from taxation.92  Other plans called for a long-term period for deter-
mining income taxes on premiums instead of the annual period that
generally applies.93 While these tax plans may have been helpful,
they would not have produced the necessary funds soon enough.
88 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
89 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964).
90 HUGHEs REPORT, supra note 4.
91 See, e.g., id. at 106-07; Hearings Before the President's National Ad-
visory Panel on Insurance in Riot-Affected Areas, at 246, 255 (1967).
92 HUGHEs REPORT, supra note 4, at 106-07.
98 Hearings Before the President's National Advisory Panel on Insur-
ance in Riot-Affected Areas, at 246, 255 (1967).
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Thus, while they would not have provided an immediate solution as
the present reinsurance program does, they should be considered as a
possible future alternative. A tax-deferral plan would permit state
and federal back-up for the insurance industry to be phased out more
rapidly.
The advantage of having separate state FAIR plans under the
Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968 is that each
state government is more closely attuned to the needs of that state
and can implement and administer a plan more responsive to its par-
ticular problems. Nevertheless, federal involvement has the advan-
tage of mobilizing greater resources and of focusing public attention
on the problem at the national level.
The plan also provides for a greater contribution from states
incurring the most riot damage. The only monies used to indemnify
riot damage in a state that do not come exclusively from that state
are the premiums paid by insurance companies for reinsurance. These
premiums serve to spread the risk throughout the nation, relieving
the ghetto property owner of having to bear the entire financial bur-
den. This approach would seem to be justified by the fact that prob-
lems of the urban core area have been created by the whole of society.
Conclusions
The federal reinsurance program was a necessary answer to the
urgent problem of making insurance available to property owners in
urban centers. Federal assistance is, however, minimized by providing
for initial financial protection by private industry and state govern-
ments. This is a desirable approach because greater governmental
participation in the plan would have increased the difficulty of re-
turning to a free and independent market. To stimulate this desired
independent status further, a tax-deferral program should be con-
sidered for future implementation.
By providing for individual state FAIR plans, the federal pro-
gram leaves insurance regulation at the state level and allows state
officials to provide particular solutions for local problems. Besides
implementing FAIR plans, the states should provide pools for the
equitable apportionment of urban risks among insurers in the state.
This would provide full utilization of the industry's capacity before
asking the federal government for assistance. However, to prevent
these pools from becoming dumping grounds for the large insurance
companies, credit systems should be created or specific underwriting
standards established.
The enactment of these suggestions, coupled with existing legis-
lation, will provide a most equitable, manageable and yet compre-
hensive system to aid the urban property owner in obtaining insurance
against riot-caused damages.
Edward M. Archibald*
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